The Bank has released a new report, identifying lessons learned in developing major infrastructure projects.

I did not read the whole report, but after reading the table of contents I did scrutinize the section on "Communicating with Stakeholders" (see pg. 49 and 50), which I reproduce here as it is *EXTREMELY* relevant to our ongoing "NGOs and Governance" study:

VII. COMMUNICATING WITH STAKEHOLDERS

135. In the last twenty years, the Bank's engagement in infrastructure was the subject of growing scrutiny by civil society organizations, the media, and the general public. This chapter first describes how communications became an important aspect of the Bank's work, and discusses specific lessons learned in embedding communications in political and stakeholder analysis, integrating communications in the project cycle, helping governments prepare and implement their own communication strategies, and communicating at both the local and global levels.

A. Growing External Scrutiny

136. The Bank is often criticized for overly focusing on economic and technical aspects of development, and for not being astute about political economy considerations. The Bank is also often criticized for not being effective at listening and communicating with stakeholders. While the reality is more complex, there is however some basis to these criticisms. Historically, a narrow interpretation of the Bank's Articles of Agreement made Bank staff reluctant to systematically assess and consider political risks or the political environment in which a proposed project or reform would occur.

The Bank's Articles of Agreement prohibit the Bank and its officers from "interfering in the political affairs of any member", and from taking decisions influenced by the political characters of its members.

137. In appraising and supporting implementation of major infrastructure projects, the Bank therefore tended not to pay much attention to political risk considerations. Communications around projects were limited to press releases issued after a project was approved or, in some cases, to efforts to control damage in response to criticisms from civil society organizations (CSOs). Partly as a consequence of this approach, Bank support for large-scale infrastructure projects often became wrought in political controversy.

138. Over time, external scrutiny intensified, in part facilitated by the rise of the internet and email, by increasing democratization in the world, by the dramatic growth of CSOs, and by the 24-hour news cycle. As external suspicions worsened and negative campaigns intensified, it became clear that the lack of stakeholder support incurred high costs to the Bank and its clients in terms of monetary losses, time delays, and project cancellations, not to mention large intangible impacts on reputation, trust and goodwill. [These are the "unanticipated transaction costs" -- time costs, money costs, reputation damage, and relationship damage -- that result from institutional and political conflict that we have been attempting to quantify in our CRGP research program.]

139. In this context, it became critical for the Bank to effectively engage with CSOs and critics around major infrastructure projects and policy directions, in particular regarding water storage and distribution (hydropower dams and water supply and sewerage systems), extractive industries (oil pipelines, coal mining), and transport (highways). Groups like the International Rivers Network, founded in 1985, were strongly advocating that dams-and the World Bank by association-were bad for poor countries. When controversies developed, although the nature of controversies varied, in retrospect critics and supporters alike emphasized the need for more adequate consultation and communication with stakeholders. Bank communications were found to often be too reactive, too defensive, and in most cases not introduced early enough in the cycle of preparing controversial projects or policies (see Box 29 on the Brazil Polonoroeste Project).

Box 29. Brazil Polonoroeste Project
The Bank supported implementation o f the Northwest Integrated Development Program (Polonoroeste) during the 1980s to provide an integrated approach to frontier development and avoid further land conflicts and illegal logging. Although a series of complementary activities were included, Polonoroeste was best known for paving highway BR 364 which linked the capital of Porto Velho to the South. Despite the fact that Bank finding was employed to pave a road already carved out of the rainforest and designed with social mitigation mechanisms, Polonoroeste is today strongly associated with the rapid deforestation and social conflict which ensued in the state. Opposition to this project led to an international letter writing campaign by environmental CSOs, numerous meetings, and testimony on Capitol Hill, which eventually culminated in the establishment of environmental and social safeguards by the Bank. However, the Bank's communications response was too little, too late.

140. Over the last ten years, improving communications with stakeholders became a strategic priority in the Bank. Although the learning process has at times been painful, the new approach has started to produce results. Relations with CSOs have improved, particularly over the last 5 years. More importantly, systematic consultations with stakeholders have positively contributed to the development effectiveness of Bank interventions. The next section highlights key lessons learned from this experience, illustrated by relevant examples.

B. Strategic Communications

141. The first lesson is the importance of embedding communications in political risk, stakeholder, and social analyses. A 2004 OED review noted that "the design and implementation of reform initiatives should be based on understanding underlying political and social processes that determine the motivation and behavior of stakeholders." [I would re-phrase this to say "the design and implementation of reform initiatives should be based on a deep understanding of the cognitive-cultural, normative, and regulative institutions that enable, guide and constrain the motivation and behavior of stakeholders." Sounds like a Dick Scott style institutional analysis to me. I wonder if the World Bank has figured out how to do this yet?] Political risk analysis highlights those reform steps that require special attention from a communications angle (e.g., privatization). Consultations with key stakeholders identified through social analysis facilitate a two-way information flow and ensure the inputs of beneficiaries and other stakeholders into program or project design. Timely access to information by stakeholders is a prerequisite for successful consultations. Communication and consultation processes need to be culturally appropriate and ensure inclusiveness of key stakeholders, including those with less voice and marginalized social groups to allow the expression of their views. This lesson served the Bank well and ensured community support for the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline project (see Box 30).

Box 30. Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline Project (communications with stakeholders)
The Bolivia Brazil Gas Pipeline Project (approved in December 1997) presented great challenges due to its complex social impacts. The challenges arose from the cross-boundary nature of the project, involving a gas producer in a small economy (Bolivia) and a huge potential demand in a large country (Brazil), the execution of a major engineering construction over 3,000 km, cutting across more than one hundred small communities in Bolivia and Brazil, including indigenous communities, small rural villages, small towns and large municipalities in Brazil.
Addressing these challenges involved four main issues. First, it required negotiations with the communities on the alignment to minimize social impacts of the right of way, as well as negotiations with individuals for acquisition of land use rights from land owners for the right of way. Second, it required control and mitigation of social impacts associated with the construction works, such as defining the appropriate location of worker camps to minimize impact on indigenous communities; enforcing safety measures and workers' code of conduct, responding to damage to private property, community infrastructure and personal injuries. Third, it required planning and agreeing n compensatory measures for the up-stream and long term impact derived from the operation of the pipeline and induced development. Finally, it required a fluid relationship with civil society and full participation of the affected population and other stakeholders in the identification of these issues, the design of appropriate compensation measures and in the monitoring of these measures.
The project developed several innovative strategies do deal with these issues. In view of the sensitive nature of impacts on people and the environment, the proponents undertook a systematic social analysis of the communities along the right of way in order to identify potential impacts, affected groups and to discuss alternatives with them. The analysis and consultations led to the design of a community development strategy involving social compensation plans and a communication strategy to ensure transparency and ownership among local communities. Careful supervision ensured compliance with the identified development objectives, including the social plans and the communication and implementation process. This process allowed a growing understanding of the concerns of different stakeholders, identification of emerging issues that needed attention, better monitoring of the performance of social compensations programs and also an improvement in the environmental inspection and monitoring system, leading to better implementation of agreed actions and continued stakeholder support for the project.

142. A second lesson is that communications are most effective when they are treated as a key part of the project cycle. Experience from several projects has shown that communications' needs assessments at the beginning of policy or project initiatives can open-up two-way dialogue with stakeholders, facilitate the exchange of information, and help identify and mitigate social, political and technical risks. Other factors identified as essential include: adopting transparency as a principle of project management and ensuring that the broad team is kept informed and accountable for staying on message. The Bank learned several of these lessons painfully, including through its experience with the Yacyreth Dam Project (see Box 31). The Bank was later able to apply lessons learned from this experience in several projects, including the Laos Nam Theun 2 Project (See Box 32).

Box 31. Argentina-Paraguay Yacyreth Dam Project
In the last two decades, the Bank was involved with Yacyreta, a large dam built on the Parana River bordering both Paraguay and Argentina. This project holds a number of lessons on the risks of not adequately communicating and the consequent failure to manage expectations of local inhabitants in the resettlement process. In fact, the Inspection Panel pointed out "the absence of an effective communication strategy between those implementing the Project and the affected population" as one of the critical issues plaguing the project which was delayed for decades. A communications' needs assessment at the beginning of the project would have helped to open-up dialogue with the various stakeholders, facilitate the exchange of information, identify and mitigate social, political and technical risks. The project is now in its completion stage, but the Bank has limited ability to influence outcomes.

Box 32. Laos Nam Theun 2 Project
The Laos Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project was approved in 2005, after almost 20 years of preparation and development, during which Bank engagement was on and off on several occasions. The project had been the subject of a long international and regional CSO campaign. Because of past experiences, management saw communications as an integral part of the project preparation team and the Project Oversight Group, which was made up o f members of the regional management team, ESSD, EXT, and LEG, and led by the East Asia and Pacific Region Vice President. The goal was to create space for regional management to do the due diligence and make a sound decision on whether to take the project to the Board, while listening to stakeholders but not being driven by external pressures.
The Regional Vice President adopted a policy of transparency at the outset of re-engagement in the project in 2001. This meant that aide-memoires and background studies were published on the Internet, and a rapid response capability was put in place to respond to letters, journalists' requests, negative articles, and other pieces posted on websites or in the press. [This could be a 'goverance variable' in our study - the presence of a 'communications team'.] The communications team placed great emphasis on identifying and maintaining contact with stakeholders, understanding the political environment and pressures on all sides, and ensuring that the broad team working on the project was kept informed. Clear and high-quality spokespeople were identified; rapid clearance procedures were put in place; materials were kept simple and up-to-date; briefings were held frequently and repeated stakeholder consultation workshops were arranged in Paris, Tokyo, Bangkok, and Washington. Management was kept informed at all times, alerted to criticisms, and consulted on the Bank's responses. Communications staff worked closely with project team members to organize briefings for key constituents, including Executive Directors in the lead-up to the Board date; and proactively shared background studies, summaries, and data on the Internet and through email lists. Several external experts on Lao PDR were engaged throughout project preparation to advise the Bank and to comment on various issues that would affect the outcome of the project and the reform program. The experts were given access to all background studies and documentation.

143. A third lesson is the importance of assisting clients in developing their own communication strategy. Communications by governments and the private sector are as or more important as what the Bank does. [Interesting. This 'governance strategy' would achieve three outcomes: (1) It would increase the capacity of host governments to deal with social pressures internally; (2) It would deflect social pressures away from the Bank and back onto the host governments themselves, and (3) It would reduce potential allegations that the Bank was meddling in host country politics and infringing on host government sovereignty.] At the country level, governments need to communicate in ways that are sensitive to local cultural and social issues of communities directly affected by the program. The Bank has learned the importance of getting agreement up front on information disclosure, on a posture of transparency and openness, and on reinforcing that message through preparation and implementation. Our partners should lead the communication efforts, but the Bank needs to help them build the capacity to do this (See Box 33).

Box 33. Sierra Leone Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project
The Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project (BHP) in Sierra Leone demonstrates how assisting the client government in developing its own communication strategy can help ensure smooth progress. The project intended to support the sustainable delivery o f quality electricity services at the lowest possible cost within the Western Area of Sierra Leone, and to promote private sector development in the country. The Board approved the project in 2005. The Bank team assisted the government of Sierra Leone in developing a comprehensive communication strategy from the outset to address a number of cultural and social issues related to the communities directly affected by the program. The strategy included an information dissemination that explained the nature and benefits of BHP and its connection to the country's economic development, as a way to build social and political support for the initiative. The communication strategy aimed to educate citizens about the importance of Bumbuna as a source o f opportunity for the country's future development. Bumbuna was presented as a symbol of hope and development-rather than simply as a dam or a source of revenue. The communication support was fine-tuned with indigenous knowledge and deliberate attention to local political structures. For example, a community radio station was established under the joint management of two factions in order to effectively reach out to all members of the community.

144. A fourth lesson is the need to communicate both locally and globally. It has become a fairly common phenomenon in World Bank infrastructure projects for local concerns to find their way into the international networks of CSOs and acquire global relevance. The scope of communication therefore needs not to be limited to helping the governments and the project partners in the design and the implementation of communication strategies and program, but also for the World Bank project teams to develop their own strategies and lead corporate dialogue with global stakeholders (See Box 34).

Box 34. West Africa Gas PiDeline Proiect
A communication assessment was requested in the early stages of development o f the West Africa Gas Pipeline Project, a major regional infrastructure initiative aimed at improving the competitiveness of Ghana, Benin and Togo, by supporting the development of a gas pipeline that would bring gas from Nigeria to those three countries. The involvement of four countries and four separate governmental structures and citizenries raised flags early on to the political complexities involved. Despite many expected positive outcomes, various stakeholders expressed concerns about the possible negative impacts of the project on local communities, the environment, and public finances. Local concerns found their way into the international networks of CSOs. A communication needs assessment was carried out in order to understand the key issues in each country and the position of different stakeholders. Overall, in both Ghana and Benin, the project garnered widespread public enthusiasm, while in Togo, the population showed little interest, as they did not anticipate any concrete impact on their country. In Nigeria, on the other hand, CSOs were mobilizing against the project. Political leaders also differed in their public support for the project. In Ghana, despite the President's personal support of the initiative, the Ministry of Energy was blamed for not having adequately involved the parliament nor engaged the public at large. This led to a broad perception of the limited overall involvement and ownership of the project, which, according to some interviewees, was driven and would benefit the private companies involved. The communication assessment advised the government of Ghana to take a more proactive stance and "speak for" the project. Recommendations also included a more open and participatory approach to the overall project communication. The Bank also held several meetings with international CSOs, and devoted adequate time and resources to address concerns. The communication assessment also advised the World Bank to take a "back seat" in terms o f public discussion and play a strong role as a facilitator of dialogue and consultations at various levels.

Source - Infrastructure: Lessons From the Last Two Decades of World Bank Engagement

Posted by rjorr at May 30, 2006 7:12 PM